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Abstract. Huserl (a mathematician by education) remained a few famous and notable philosophical
“slogans” along with his innovative doctrine of phenomenology directed to transcend “reality” in a more
general essence underlying both “body” and “mind” (after Descartes) and called sometimes “ontology”
(terminologically following his notorious assistent Heidegger). Then, Husserl’s tradition can be tracked as
an idea for philosophy to be reinterpreted in a way to be both generalized and mathenatizable in the final
analysis. The paper offers a pattern borrowed from the theory of information and quantum information
(therefore relating philosophy to both mathematics and physics) to formalize logically a few key concepts
of Husserl’s phenomenology such as “epoché” “eidetic, phenomenological, and transcendental
reductions” as well as the identification of “phenomenological, transcendental, and psychological
reductions” in a way allowing for that identification to be continued to “eidetic reduction” (and thus to
mathematics). The approach is tested by an independent and earlier idea of Husserl, “logical arithmetic”
(parallelly implemented in mathematics by Whitehead and Russell’s Principia) as what “Hilbert
arithmetic” generalizing Peano arithmetics is interpreted. A basic conclusion states for the unification of
philosophy, mathematics, and physics in their foundations and fundamentals to be the Husserl tradition
both tracked to its origin (in the being itself after Hidegger or after Husserl’s “zu Sache selbst”) and
embodied in the development of human cognition in the third millennium.
Keywords: epoché, Hilbert arithmetic, Husserl reductions, information and quantum information,
qubit Hulbert space
I INTRODUCTION ENTERING FROM PHILOSOPHY
Husserl’s phenomenology suggests a reinterpretation of the previous tradition (which is that
of Western philosophy starting from Descartes) as any other great philosophical doctrine:
The mind - body problem of Cartesian dualism was resolved only by Kant’s
transcendentalism, for that involving (rather implicitly) the concept of the totality, which was
reinterpreted very soon by Hegel’s dialectic of the “objective development of the Spirit” (where
“Spirit” is what substitutes the totality).
One may suggest that phenomenology exploits the same core of the “totality” implemented
successfully by the classical German philosophical discourse, applying it to new areas and
fundamental problems by relevant terminology, which Husserl introduced. Then, “epoché” can
be seen as the relevant “bridge” from Hegel’s “synthesis” (and “triad”, respectively) to Husserl’s
“reductions” of a few kinds, and then, even before “triad”: from the implicit formal structure,
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which transcendentalism introduces for the “totality” meaning that necessary reversible doubling
of the “immanent” and “transcendent” into the “transcendental”1.
One can find the same structure of the totality, implying be doubled definitively, in Husserl’s
“epoché” if the “real” is what substitutes the “immanent”; the “unreal”, the “transcendent”; and
the “phenomenal” (or “reel”), the “transcendental”. “Epoché” is that operation both mental and
fundamental, able to deliver the “phenomenon” in Husserl’s sense, which is essentially different
from that of Kant, after whom it was rather linked to the “immanent” and opposed to the
“transcendent”.
If one prefers Hegel’s vocabulary, the same essence would be expressed by the “triad” of
“synthesis”, “antithesis”, and “synthesis”, correspondingly.
Formal philosophy following the track of Husserl’s “philosophy as a rigorous science”
(implicitly embodying that paradigm also implemented in mathematics) is to abandon the
question of which the relevant interpretation is among the enumerated above (or other similar)
ones once the analogical question of reality has be forsaken or “bracketed” definitively as to
“epoché”:
One is to restrict the research to the formal structure of doubling implied by the totality,
maybe surprisingly identifiable as that of a bit of information. Indeed, if the visualization of a bit
of information by a tape cell of Turing machine is used, the “phenomenon” (respectively,
“synthesis” or “transcendental”) corresponds to an empty cell, “reality” (“thesis”, the
“immanent”), to “1” (or to “0”, the one alternative), and “unreality” (“antithesis”, the
“transcendent”), to “0” (or to “1”, the other alternative).
Further, that formal understanding of “epoché” is the sufficient basis for the formal
reinterpretation of all Husserl reductions, namely eidetic, phenomenological, psychological, and
transcendental, by the concept of information applicable as to finite sets or series as to infinite
ones (properly, quantum information in a preliminary understanding opposing it disjunctively to
“classical” information as “infinity” to “finiteness”).
II INTRODUCTION ENTERING FROM MATHEMATICS
One can grant that the philosophical problem of the totality implying definitively doubling
shares the same formal structure as that about the foundations of mathematics (respectively, the
corresponding “crisis” or “paradoxes”): that is the structure of a bit of information as above.
Indeed, that “completeness” would be to be interpreted as the unification of Husserl’s “unreality”
(which can be interpreted as the mathematical reality of all models only related to the physical
and material reality by itself distinguished from it “either - or”), on the one hand, and his “reality
of the natural attitude”, on the other hand, by the concept of “phenomenon”, which should
corresponds to a Pythagorean identification of the “unreality” of mathematical reality with the
physical reality by itself, after which the being in the most fundamental philosophical sense is
mathematical in the final analysis.
1 The paper is based on his article for Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927) as the most concise source relevant for
formalization. The investigation of the development of Husserl’s ideas and concepts is far from its intention.
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That is the corresponding formal structure of a bit of information, implied by the totality, but
interpreted now particularly to the foundations of mathematics or its philosophy (necessarily
turning out to be Pythagorean), is representable by the opposition of all mathematical models
(“0”, the one alternative) to the world by itself (“1”, the other alternative), and both identifiable
as the same (e.g. as in the visualization by an “empty” tape cell of Turing machine) therefore
overcoming Descartes’s dualism simply postulating for the “body” and “mind” to be the same
not less than being two absolutely distinguished entities.
Two of the most famous and relevant synoptic demonstrations of the troubles about the
consistent completeness of mathematics are Russell’s paradox about the set of all sets (Russell
1902) and the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931). Therefore, they can serve for representing
concisely the way, in which the above “Pythagorean solution” for mathematics can be
established:
Russell’s paradox reveals the well-known unresolvable antinomy about the set of all sets not
belonging to themselves, whether it belongs to itself or not. The Zermelo (1908) solution (at that,
being ad hoc) does not allow for the set of all sets to be admissible (e.g. postulating the condition
for any admissible set to be a subset, and thus, the set of all sets does not satisfy it definitively).
The criticism of it consists in the observation that it is too strong, therefore excluding relevant
and consistent theorems, methods, and even areas of mathematics, cancelling factually its
completeness in order to avoid Russelll’s direct corollary from Cantor’s “naïve” set theory.
Once the totality is admitted as a mathematical postulate, and thus as a scientific concept
(Penchev 2020 August 25), Russell’s paradox can be reinterpreted as a special (even definitive)
property of the totality or as a corollary from it in the particular case of the “set of all sets” (now
understood as an embodiment of the totality to be applicable to the foundations of mathematics):
Then, the “set of all sets” (as a particular expression for the totality) impling for it to be
definitively doublable: once, as the set of all sets belonging to themselves; and twice, as the set of
all sets not belonging to themselves. The reconciliation of Russell’s paradox to the standard
scientific propositional logic needing the “law of noncontradiction” (therefore allowing for that
antimony to be interpreted as a usual statement) consists in the following:
The formal structure of a bit of information is definitively (and thus necessarily) attached to it
and unlike any part of the totality, to which the researcher’s free will can choose to consider it as
a wholeness attaching the bit at issue or not. That is, the researcher must choose: either to
interpret the investigated entity as a wholeness by assigning the bit at issue (properly originating
from the totality once postulated mathematically), or to interpret it as a part of any other whole,
therefore excluding the bit in question:
Then, the totality is defined as that unique case where that bit is to be ascribed definitively to
the entity, claiming to be the totality, and therefore suspending the researcher’s choice to add it or
not. That solution can be interpreted in relation as to Russell’s paradox itself as to its “classical”
solution restricting a set to be definiable after the condition to be a subset (of some other set,
which is not necessary to be certain explicitly):
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So, a bit of information, namely that of Russel’s paradox, is assigned to the set of all sets, and
its two opposite alternatives, which cannot be considered simultaneously according to the
definition of a bit of information, are correspondingly: the set of all sets belonging to themselves,
the set of all sets not belonging to themselves. The law of noncontradiction is obeyed, for
Russell’s antinomy is reduced formally to a “harmless” usual statement by dividing the two
contradictory alternatives to those of the complementing bit.
Obviously, this is a formal solution consequently applicable to any antinomy of any kind; in
turn it allows for a newly “paradoxical” definition of a bit of information (and thus, implying a
reformulation of the quantity and concept of information as far as the bit of information is its
unit, by which it can be measured): a bit of information is the minimal complement (or solution)
of any antinomy to a consistent statement.
As to the classical solution of Russell’s paradox, it is isomorphic to the addition of a
complementing bit of information as above. Indeed, that bit is: a certain element belongs or not
to any set at issue. Thus, the set of all sets, not satisfying that condition, is not a “set” after the
restriction and Russell’s paradox does not make sense. Indeed, this solution is too strong, quite
redundantly excluding the set of all sets (and thus, the totality from mathematics) and preventing
any eventual future construction of a bridge able to smoothly connect mathematics to philosophy,
physics, and all branches of science in the final analysis.
On the contrary, the set of all sets can be consistently admitted if a complementing bit formal
and absolutely independent of any eventual interpretation is necessary in its definition
originating from that of the totality as it is elucidated above. One can track that the same
complementing bit of information can remove the Gödel incompleteness of arithmetic to set
theory:
Concisely, the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) mean that Peano arithmetic is either
incomplete or contradictory to set theory (ZFC). One can reformulate that result by investigating
the necessary and sufficient condition, under which a system including Peano arithmetic and
(ZFC) set theory as a true subclass would be both complete and consistent. In other words, one is
to search for and then research the complement (in the sense of set theory) of the set
corresponding to the former class, to the set corresponding to the latter class.
A heuristic direction how the complement at issue can be reached in an explicit and
preferably constructive way can be suggested by the solution of Russell’s paradox as far a one
can find a certain formal similarity to the antinomy of the Liar utilized by Gödel himself in the
introduction of his paper (Gödel 1931: 175-176) to explain the intention, sense, and scheme of
the proof based on the existence of the finite Gödel number attachable to the proposition stating
to be false (analogically to the “Liar”); even more so that again Gödel himself has written in a
footnote, “14” (Gödel 1931: 175) that any antinomy would be relevant to be used.
Russell's paradox, that of the Liar, and the Godel proposition stating to be false share the
deficiency of a bit of information, after the eventual addition of which all the three are
transformed in “harmless” sentences as statements whether true or false. That missing bit of
information in relation to Russell's paradox is elucidated above.
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As to the “Liar”, one can interpret that bit so that its alternatives are: (1) the Liar’s statement
refers to itself therefore being true; (2) the Liar’s statement refers to anything else therefore being
false. In fact, the construction “I lie” is elliptic, and the real use always means explicitly or
implicitly the complete sentence “I lie that (any proposition relevant to me) “ and furthermore
restricted to (2): thus adding the bit at issue by its value exactly determined as (2). The elliptic
construction “I lie” is similar to that of the “set of all sets” due to a missing bit of information2.
As to the Gödel proposition stating to be false (respectively, by means of its Gödel number),
the alternatives of the missing bit can be determined so: (1) the proposition stating for itself to be
false is true; (2) it stating for anything else to be false is false. Then, the problem is whether a
certain finite Gödel number can be assigned unambiguously to the Gödel proposition once it is
determined only to the “nearest bit of information”. In other words, its implicit and binary
uncertainty consists in the option to be interpreted in two ways inconsistent to each other: (1) as
an element of the class; (2) as that class itself; or respectively, (1) as an element of an implicit
class; (2) as the same element considered as class (for example, as in Russell’s theory of types
e.g. according to his “Principles of mathematics”3) distinguishes them fundamentally and forbids
them to be used simultaneously, and the Gödel proposition does just this, therefore violating the
prohibition.
That binary uncertainty can be overcome if and only if two mismatching Gödel numbers are
ascribed to the Gödel proposition. They can be identified with each other if and only if they are
infinite ordinal numbers in virtue of sharing the same (infinite) cardinal number. Consequently,
they cannot be finite natural numbers (as it seems initially) for all natural numbers are finite, due
to the axiom of induction.
One can track that bit of uncertainty following Gödel’s original proof, but only conceptually
according to the philosophical “genre” of the present paper. It can be found in the Gödel
proposition though remaining only implicit and therefore needing an elucidation to be noticed.
The proposition states that the proposition possessing a certain Gödel number is false and that
the certain Gödel number at issue is  that of the proposition itself.
Following the track of the “Liar”, the proposition restricts itself only to the “true half” of the
Liar’s statement: namely, that “I lie that I lie (that I say truth)” is a true statement in the virtue of
the tautology that the Liar is a liar. However, that restriction is possible only at first glance, but
implies just one bit of uncertainty, in fact, due to the inseparability of the “true half” from the
“false half”:
3 In detail in: Daesuk, DePaul 2013; Rodriguez Consuegra 1989;
2 And vice versa: one can admit that the converse statement is also true. Namely, any non-paradoxical
statement can be transformed into an antinomy by depriving it of a bit of information chosen relevantly
and the existence of which is necessary. For example, “The moon is full” as far as this means both a
sentence, which is “true” being built correctly (as in the case), and a fact being true if only if it is adequate
to the experience. Without assigning that bit (eventually, by means of a certain value of the bit), the
statement is a paradox, just as the “Liar”. Indeed, the syntactically correct sentence interpreted as a fact
implies the contradiction of being both true and false.
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Indeed, after reflecting backwards, to itself, the proposition is to be represented so: the
proposition possessing its Gödel number is false. Then, this is equivalent to the negation of the
conjunction of the following two statements: (A) “The proposition possesses that Gödel
number”, and (B) the proposition itself; so that: . Further, the original¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) = ¬𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐵
proof postulates that , which is equivalent to “A is true”. However, this is an¬𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐵 =¬𝐵
additional postulate justified only ostensibly by the “lemma” to it, namely that there exists a
bijection of all natural numbers in Peano arithmetic and all propositions in the first order logic
meant and defined by the  Gödel paper (i.e. the “Gödel enumeration”).
Then, all those propositions of the first order logic cannot include the Gödel proposition if it
refers to itself. Its transformation into a “normal” first order proposition by the mediation of the
Gödel enumeration is nominal, only at a first glance. The reason is that the Gödel enumeration
lemma includes as a condition all natural numbers in Peano arithmetic (in which all natural
numbers are finite in virtue of the axiom of induction), the enumeration of the Gödel proposition
needs the set of all natural numbers in Peano arithmetic (which is infinite in virtue of the axiom
of infinity, e.g. in ZFC).
Then, the Gödel number of the Gödel proposition is either infinite (transfinite) or it is
ambiguous, being finite, if the postulate ” above is not accepted, the statement"¬𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐵 =¬𝐵
A is false, and the real Gödel number of the Gödel proposition is some other and different from
that only alleged in A. In other words, the implicit bit of uncertainty in relation to the Gödel
proposition in the framework of Gödel’s original proof is due to the opposition “the Gödel
number of the Gödel proposition is an element of the set of all natural numbers in Peano
arithmetic” versus “the Gödel number of the Gödel proposition is a natural number in Peano
arithmetic”. The mismatch of the two interpretations does not appear in any proposition, which
does not refer to itself indirectly by the mediation of its own Gödel number. The same opposition
can be developed further (as far as any bit is two oppositions: a) “no choice” versus “choice”; b)
if the case is “choice”, the “one alternative chosen” versus the “other alternative chosen”). If the
“Gödel number of the Gödel proposition is a natural number in Peano arithmetic” is the case,
“the explicit number in the Gödel proposition is true” versus “it is false” (i.e. the real number is
certain, but other than that alleged in the proposition and unknown).
That consideration makes clear that Gödel’s proof relies on a missing bit of information just
as Russell’s paradox does, but does not offer yet any construction able to complement both
Peano arithmetic and set theory to a complete and consistent system. Anyway, the discussion
now suggests that the bit is to be addable only at the metalevel since the adoption of a bit to
Peano arithmetic would remain it just the same (i.e. identical).
Hilbert arithmetic debated in detail in other papers (e.g.: in Penchev 2020 August 25) is an
example of how Peano arithmetic can be complemented in a way to be both complete and
consistent with set theory. Furthermore, Hilbert arithmetic can be considered as complementary
or equivalent to the qubit Hilbert space (and thus to the separable complex Hilbert space of
quantum mechanics in the final analysis) so that it only “translates” the existent proof of the
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absence of hidden variables in quantum mechanics (Neumann 1932; Kochen, Specker 1967) into
the “language of mathematics and its foundations” (i.e. both arithmetic and set theory).
Indeed, Hilbert arithmetic can be seen as Peano arithmetic, to which only a single bit is
added, but as if “outside”, i.e. at its metalevel so that it is able to consistently include set theory
as a true part. Peano arithmetic is doubled by its isomorphic, but anti-isometric counterpart
needing exactly two substitutions starting from the former, “normal” Peano arithmetic: (1) it
begins from “infinity” (i.e from the less countable ordinal often notated by )4: it substitutes"ω"
“1” of the “normal” Peano arithmetic; (2) the function successor is defined as rather"𝑛 − 1"
than as ."𝑛 + 1"
Speaking loosely, the second “twin” of Peano arithmetic starts from “infinity” moving
backwards to the finiteness where the “first twin dwells” as far as it starts from “1” moving
“forwards” to infinity. The two twins are indistinguishable from each other in all the rest and can
be granted to be identical as two “complementary” copies of the same. They can be interpreted
equally well as the two alternative elementary choices of a bit of information identifiable as the
bit which is to be added to Peano arithmetic “externally”.
The last statement implies the hypothesis of the existence of a “coherent state of both twins,
preceding each of them”. It can be represented by “mixing” the two oppositely directed
well-orderings e.g. as if each well-ordering is interpreted by the binary relation " ≥ ",  " ≤ "
correspondingly rather than by , after which the coherent state turns out to be a" > ",  " < "
colossal equality ."1 = 2 = 3 =...   =  ...  = ω − 2 = ω − 1 = ω"
It can be interpreted as a special, nonstandard or “degenerated” Peano arithmetic, which can
start from any element or “natural number”, and the function successor is defined as as"𝑛 = "
far as any unary operation implies a certain binary relation of the operand and result. One can
prove that the nonstandard Peano arithmetic possesses the structure of Boolean algebra (after a
relevant definition of the Boolean operations), by which it can be identified as isomorphic to
both propositional logic and set theory.
One can notice that Hilbert arithmetic corresponds exactly to the qubit Hilbert space as
follows. The former can be acquired from the latter as the class of equivalence of all possible
values for each qubit. Conversely, the latter follows from the former after the unambiguous
distinction of any element within each class of equivalence, which any unit of Hilbert arithmetic
is. This allows for the identification of Peano arithmetic with any qubit, as repeated locally
within each unit of itself as the one or other counterpart of Peano arithmetics belonging to
Hilbert arithmetic.
Those exact (in the two directions) mappings of Hilbert arithmetic and the qubit Hilbert space
are the “smooth bridge” between physics and mathematics, necessary (but not sufficient) to
4 The least countable ordinal number exists in virtue of the axiom of choice able to order well the set of all countable
ordinals. So, the axiom of choice as a relevant equivalent is necessary in Hilbert arithmetic to settle the relation of
the two counterparts of Peano arithmetic. The sense of the axiom of choice in Hilbert arithmetic consists in
postulating that “metabit” in question, i.e. the bit of the next metalevel, also interpretable as a “primary choice” for
either the one or the other “twin” to be chosen initially.
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establish Husserl’s phenomenology as a rigorous science5 (in an absolute literary and exact
meaning rather than as a metaphor). One is to complement it by the philosophical interpretation
of the bit of information, which is to be added at the next metalevel, already implemented in
advance in the philosophical introduction of the paper (Section I).
III INTRODUCTION ENTERING FROM PHYSICS
It needs the exhaustive interpretation and thus unification of quantum mechanics and the
theory of quantum information, often denoted briefly as “quantum mechanics and information”
undertaken in the last quarter of the 20th century and underlain by the debate of Bohr and
Einstein about the foundations of quantum mechanics, the proof of Bell’s inequalities, the
experimental confirmation of their violations, the investigation of various phenomena of
entanglement, etc.
However, the only necessary result is the identification6 of the qubit Hilbert space with the
separable complex Hilbert space sufficient for quantum mechanics to be justified rigorously
(Neumann 1932): after that the foundations of quantum mechanics (namely, the separable
complex Hilbert space) and mathematics (namely, Hilbert arithmetic) are connected stably,
reliably, and smoothly to each other. Any physical result can be interpreted as a mathematical
theorem in the final analysis and not less: vice versa.
Indeed, modern physics appeared as mathematical after Galileo and Newton. A bewilderment
ascribed to Einstein7 was why the world is rational. Indeed, the rationality of the world allows for
physics and science to occur and establish, but itself seems to be a strange, unexplainable, and
confusing  fact, a ridiculous “gift of God” without any natural cause or simply any reason.
7 The sentence ascribed to Einstein is: “The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is
comprehensible” (e.g., https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/albert_einstein_125369 ). In fact, the real
words of Einstein (1936: 351) are quite loosely interpreted and then ascribed to him as an exact quotation.
Einstein wrote literally: “One may say "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility." It is one
of the great realisations of Immanuel Kant that the setting up of a real external world would be senseless
without this comprehensibility.” Einstein’s conclusion is the following: “It is in this sense that the world
of our sense experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle.” Anyway, that
“Einstein’s sentence” loosely retold and presented as a citation is a cultural artefact. (The translation in
English by J. Picard is cited here: Einstein’s original in German is also published in the same issue of the
journal immediately before the translation: pp. 313-245)
6 That identification is almost trivial e.g. after the following convention. Any vector belonging to the
separable complex Hilbert space implies unambiguously a vector, the components of which are qubits, the
number of which are less than the former just by a unit. Accordingly, unitarity is modified quite weakly
by virtue of that unit. If one grants the separable complex Hilbert space to be infinitely dimensional in
general, it is identical to the qubit Hilbert space. Any finite-dimensional subspace of the separable
complex Hilbert space can be equivalently represented as infinitely dimensional by adding an infinite
number of zero coefficients.
5 Obviously the allusion is to the famous paper of Husserl (1910): its context is also necessary to
formulate the way in which “phenomenology as a rigorous science” can be considered literally rather than
metaphorically.
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If the foundations of physics and mathematics can be merged after both Hilbert arithmetic
and qubit Hilbert space (respectively, the separable complex Hilbert space) are complementary to
each other, one can interpret the mathematical “half of the world” as that implicit, but absolutely
necessary “half” complementing the experienceable “half” of the real physical experiment at the
moment therefore delivering the rationality of the world and so astounding for Einstein.
Adopting the fundamental randomness of any quantum entity, humankind accesses the
absolute rationality of the world. This is a statement only seeming (only at a first glance) to be
paradoxical: both fundamental randomness and absolute rationality are the two alternatives of a
bit of information, being in a coherent state in the world by itself.
Husserl’s phenomenology (following the track of philosophical tradition) copies the same
formal structure of a bit of information, and moreover, it shares a similar interpretation as the
motivation for “philosophy as a rigorous science”,
That “philosophical” bit of information can be visualized by the missing two bits after
(quantum)8 teleportation as well as due to merging the foundations of physics, mathematics, and
philosophy. The two bits are to be delivered by any subliminal channel rather than quantum or
instantly. They are two oppositions after the standard definition of a bit of information and
neglecting an implicit preliminary opposition between the absence of choice (an empty tape cell
of Turing machine) and the choice itself, in turn divided explicitly into the two alternatives
(denoted usually as “0” and “1” in relation to the Turing machine tape cell). So, one can
conclude (for an eloquent paradox) that any bit consists of two bits, in fact, because of the
explanation just above.
So, the two deficient bits (equivalent to a single bit) after teleportation are isomorphic to the
“philosophical” bit of information. Furthermore, the missing two bits e.g. after transmitting or
better, exchanging of a qubit of quantum information between Alec and Barbara (or Alice and
Bob) can be interpreted philosophically enough as follows: (1) the coherent quantum
superposition of Alec and Barbara versus their decoherent states as properly Barbara and Alec in
two space-time points arbitrarily distant from each other; (2) the choice of whose experience:
either Barbara’s or Alec’s.
So, if one compares the two exchanged qubits (rather than only one transmitted from Alice to
Bob) they would be the same as in (1) to (2) as in Alec’s experience to Barbara’s. Then, the
philosophical bit of information, but already in terms of Barbara and Alec’s experiment, can be
interpreted as necessary to distinguish Alec from Barbara unambiguously and ultimately: (1)
Barbara and Alec are different entities; (2) if the case is (1), this is Alec, and this is Barbara.
As a formal structure of the experiment, only a single qubit is sufficient, but tripled for the
experiment to be described exhaustively. Just the tripling into a triad of identical qubits is the
physical sense and meaning of the “philosophical” bit9 of information. Conversely, the triad of
Husserl’s epoche can be described perfectly formally by the symmetries of three identical qubits,
9 One can notice that the bit of three identical qubits is isomorphic to the qubit Hilbert space due to the
axiom of choice.
8 The brackets serve to hint that any teleportation different from quantum does not exist.
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however interpreted in a certain Husserlian manner: e.g. as an arbitrary entity, its mental image,
and their shared phenomenon identifying the former two in virtue of “epoché”.
IV HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY INTERPRETED BOTH FORMALLY AND AS
THE UNIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHY, PHYSICS, AND MATHEMATICS
One needs what “formal interpretation” means after a rigorous interpretation of the term: a
certain mathematical structure is assigned to Husserl’s phenomenology as a philosophical
doctrine and claiming to be its exhaustive model just as mathematical structures can be models
of physical theories. The same structure is to be shared by theories referring to the foundations of
physics (quantum mechanics and information), mathematics (Hilbert arithmetic), and philosophy
(Husserl’s phenomenology) therefore unifying and merging them.
That enterprise seems to be eclectic and foredoomed, but only at a first glance. The prejudice
against it, rooted in both philosophical and scientific traditions, can be rationalized into the
following two main objections: (1) their subjects are not only absolutely different, but
incompatible and incommensurable; (2) not only their approaches and methods are absolutely
different, but even they confess incompatible and incommensurable concepts of truth: speaking
loosely, logical consistency and completeness for mathematics; experimental confirmations of
competing mathematical models (therefore consistent and complete logically in advance) for
physics; the dogmatic and fundamentally unfalsifiable postulation for philosophical doctrines
anyway competing between each other for proponents and supporters just as any other artefact in
art, humanity, and politics.
Nonetheless, those redlines of distinction might be overcome under certain conditions partly
available in the philosophical and scientific tradition of Modernity until now. The gap between
physics and mathematics can be bridged by a theory interpretable both mathematical and
physical containing an internal proof of its consistent completeness for mathematics and
confirmed by the experiments up to now for physics, furthermore making testable and thus
falsifiable predictions.
The gap between the unfalsifiable philosophical doctrine and a scientific theory, whether
physical or mathematical, being falsifiable definitively though following different criteria for
falsifiability can be cancelled by a kind of “scientific transcendentalism”10 sketched here as well
as in other papers (Penchev 2021 April 12; 2021 February 25; 2020 October 19). It relies on the
postulate of the totality featuring philosophical transcendentalism, but interpreted now as a
scientific principle thus allowing for its estimation according to conclusions, direct corollaries,
and general consistency or compatibility with other theories in physics and mathematics (first of
all, referring to their foundations).
Husserl’s idea for “philosophy as a rigorous science” coincides with that of scientific
transcendentalism in a few essential features whether explicitly or implicitly. He followed the
traditions of both mathematics (being a mathematician by education) and philosophical
10 Particularly, “mathematical transcendentalism” or “physical transcendentalism”, “physical and
mathematical transcendentalism”.
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transcendentalism (suggesting for “phenomenon” to be definiable by “epoché to reality” (i.e. to
the reality of any entity) furthermore searching for the general logical and transcendental
foundations shareable as by arithmetic as by any science striving or claiming to be strict and
rigorous (for example, meaning even so humanitarian disciplines as philosophy or psychology
researching Spirit or mind and seeming to be too elusive and self-contradictory, at least in
comparison with the subjects of mathematics or physics).
One can demonstrate that the mathematical structure of Hilbert arithmetic, furthermore
identifiable as the structure dual (and equivalent in the sense of complementarity) to the qubit
Hilbert space, can claim to satisfy the requirement notated by (1) above. As to (2), one is to infer
Hilbert arithmetic (a.k.a. the qubit Hilbert space of quantum information, a.k.a. the separable
complex Hilbert space of quantum mechanics) from the scientific postulate of the “totality”. As
far as this has been done in other papers (e.g. in Penchev 2020 October 20) more or less, the
clear demarcation of physical, mathematical and especially philosophical parts of the ultimately
assembled, integrated and fitted structure can be the specific accent in this paper, moreover it
assists to be reinterpreted Husserl’s reduction and even, to be found their counterparts in
fundamental physical symmetries (such as the symmetries U(1), SU(2), SU(3) of the Standard
model, the symmetry of local and global space, etc) or in fundamental mathematical symmetries
(e.g. the symmetry of finite and infinite sets after Skolem’s “relativity of the concept of set”, the
symmetry of idempotency, such as that of the two dual Hilbert space, etc).
The qubit Hilbert space can be identified with Hilbert arithmetic as it is described above, but
also by the following procedure. All elements of the qubit Hilbert space (speaking loosely, also
all qubits, or all wave functions or all quantum states in the universe possible ever) can be
ordered well in virtue of the axiom of choice and thus mapped bijectively into all transfinite
natural ordinal numbers less than the least infinite countable ordinal number.
Then, they can be interpreted also as all finite natural numbers of the twin (dual) Peano
arithmetic, but as if “seen” from the viewpoint of the other twin: as following from its beginning
by its function successor. Properly, the relation of idempotency between the two dual Peano
arithmetics (each of which seems as the qubit Hilbert space from the “viewpoint of the other
one”) corresponds isomorphically to the Heisenberg uncertainty after one has identified the
certainty of a quantum state to be measured quite exactly:
Indeed, the cost of that absolute accuracy in quantum mechanics (unlike classical physics
where the analogical absolute accuracy is “for free”) is just the absolute uncertainty of the dual
wave function (i.e. the wave function of the conjugate quantum quantity or state) in turn being
mathematically the same as “empty qubits” or the “classes of equivalence of all possible values”
of those qubits: i.e. in the final analysis the units of the usual Peano arithmetic.
Summarizing concisely, the physical sense (but not less: the strict meaning) of Peano
arithmetic (and thus, of arithmetic at all and then, of mathematics) is to be interpreted as the
conjugate counterpart of the physical world being complementary to each other and also
equivalent though in the sense of Bohr’s complementarity and as far as it allows for
complementary entities to be considered as equivalent (i.e. as a consistent metaphysical
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assumption unfalsifiable and excluding fundamentally any experimental verification). Anyway,
that complementarity can be transformed into falsifiable by virtue of “scientific
transcendentalism”: namely, investigating its logical consistency in Hilbert arithmetic and
demonstrating its interpretability as the physical world of quantum mechanics.
Meaning the above consideration, the “philosophical” bit of information would consist of the
following (or better, its sense consists in the following): (1) the wholeness (corresponding to the
“totality”) of all natural numbers as an infinite set (though all natural numbers are finite in Peano
arithmetic by virtue of the axiom of induction) is added externally to Peano arithmetic, but (2)
only as an option. i.e. formally representable as a bit of information; (3) that option applied to
itself (“self-referentially”) implies the identification of the “empty bit, the one and the other of its
alternatives” (all the three) as three copies of the same qubit; one can notice that (4) the structure
meant in (3) is isomorphic to the qubit Hilbert space due to the axiom of choice; at last
consequently, (5) the “philosophical” bit of information is both complement of all structures
studied by mathematics to the physical world investigated by quantum mechanics, on the one
hand, and identification of them as the same qubit, on the other nand. This means: the
“philosophical” bit of information (1) introduces and thus distinguishes the local from the global
space by a bit of classical information, and (2) allows for them to be identified, after that, as the
same qubit of quantum information.
That “global bit” consisting of three identical “local qubits” at the corresponding three
sublevels is the formal structure granted to be relevant to phenomenology. The isomorphism of it
to both Hilbert arithmetic and qubit Hilbert space has been already demonstrated. What follows
is the interpretation in the proper terms of Hussel’s phenomenology.
V HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY AS A RIGOROUS SCIENCE
A few preliminary notices are to elucidate:
(1) The several kinds of reduction suggest implicitly to be unfiable as the same reduction
appearble differently, namely as eidetic, phenomenological (psychological), or transcendental
reduction, each of which emphasizes one certain different aspect of that general reduction
therefore neglecting the rest ones. So, phenomenological (psychologic11) reduction accents on the
symmetry12 of reality (or Descrte’s “body”) and its mental correlate, or the pure phenomena of
the things themselves; eidetic reduction, to the symmetry of the single wholeness of any entity,
e.g. claiming to be mental, and the infinite variety of its properties or accidental features e.g.
claiming to be “real”; at last, transcendental symmetry able to unify and identity the former two
12 The term “symmetry” is not relevant to the authentic Husserl doctrine not being used explicitly in his
papers, but it is even necessary if the objectivity (as here) is to reveal a hidden underlying formal structure
able to unify phenomenology with mathematical and physical theories.
11 Respectively, psychological reduction emphasizes a certain sub-aspect of phenomenological reduction,
after which phenomenology can be considered as a doctrine of pure psychology purified from the
accidental impurities of psychologism to its necessary essence. It can be interpreted as a result of the
psychological counterpart of “epoché”, which abandons whether an entity is mental or not, analogically to
“whether it is real or not”. In other words, both phenomenological and psychological reduction share the
same formal structure, which is that of the “philosophical” bit of information.
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can be accepted to be a meta-symmetry of the phenomenological and eidetic reduction implicitly
defining the totality or wholeness being valid to any wholeness or completeness, but not to any
part thus neither “whole”, nor “complete”.
(2) The concept of symmetry is meant implicitly by Husserl in the framework of his
terminology of “epoché”, “phenomenon”, “reduction”, etc. The sense of “symmetry” in the
context of Husserl’s phenomenology is to be understood as follows. Fundamental philosophical
distinctions such as those of Descrtes’s dualism or the opposition “subject - object” in classical
German philosophy are underlain from their symmetry. The same idea in the present paper is
necessary to reveal the fundamental structure of the “philosophical” bit after which the symmetry
corresponds to the state before the distinction and which makes the latter possible.
(3) At the same time, the concept of symmetry allows for phenomenology once considered
formally to be unified with mathematical and physical theories, in the foundations of which is
used universally rather than only often. For example, the concept of symmetry distinguishes and
unifies the class of equivalence (what “set” means particularly) with each of its elements in
mathematics; or the three fundamental physical interactions of the Standard model: the weak
SU(2), the strong SU(3), or the electromagnetic U(1) interaction.
Meaning the above preliminary notices, the explication of Huserl’s phenomenology as a
rigorous science can be reduced to: (a) the symmetries of classical and quantum information
embedded into the structure of a bit consisting of three identical “empty” qubits, already
discussed in another paper (Penchev 2021 June 8); (b) the interpretation of all Husserl reductions
by the same structure, which follows in detail now:
As to phenomenological (psychological) reduction, one is to mean the symmetry of the two
alternatives of a bit of information (such as the “philosophical” bit of information), both
excluding the symmetries of the bit corresponding to phenomenon with each of both alternatives
in virtue of time arrow granted to be rather a fundamental condition in Husserl’s phenomenology.
Anyway, one can admit a kind of generalized phenomenology, in the framework of which time is
suspended thus allowing for the other two symmetries as possible counterparts of
phenomenological reduction.
As to eidetic reduction, one is to mean the symmetry of an empty qubit as the class of
equivalence of all possible values of it, “locally” to its wholeness, “globally”, i.e. in the structure
of the bit at the metalevel. In other words, eidetic reduction corresponds to the symmetry of the
philosophical metalevel to the scientific level both physical and mathematical and thus to the
idea of scientific transcendentalism symmetric to philosophical transcendentalism. Indeed,
Husserl himself explained eidetic reduction by the class of equivalence of the eidetic core to all
possible properties of the entity at issue, an infinite set presumably in general. Also, eidetic
reduction can be understood as the identification of the global and local space in the Standard
model.
As for transcendental reduction, the great philosopher suggested that it was the same as
phenomenological reduction, but interpreted to the totality itself. One can admit that
transcendental reduction is able to unify phenomenological and eidetic reduction as merging into
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each other in virtue of the postulate of the totality: namely, once doubled by itself and embedded
in the concept of phenomenological reduction, and twice, self-referential also by itself in eidetic
reduction, Then, the totality itself can be defined exhaustively by the above identification of both
“phenomenon” and “eidos” of anything.
Though the postulate of the totality was formulated initially in philosophy as speculative,
non-empirical, metaphysical, and unfalsifiable, scientific transcendentalism constitutes itself by
its transfer in mathematics and physics and its translation into their language(s) therefore
admitting the double verification of logical completeness and consistency, and experimental
confirmation for its corollaries and conclusion, the refusal of which would reject the postulate
itself in virtue of modus tollens.
Most of the testable statements (whether logically or experimentally) are constructed by the
concept of the wholeness of anything, meaning that any entity can be considered as a particular
totality in the following rigorous meaning. As “particular”, it is to be a part of something whether
explicitly or constructively known or only necessarily existent. Nonetheless as a wholeness, it
should be similar to the totality, doubling itself transcendentally in two coinciding hypostases,
both as “phenomenon” and as “eidos”, different from each other in the former consideration as a
part from something.
Those two viewpoints to any entity do not generate a contradiction being complementary to
each other, forcing the researcher to choose in advance only one of them. Furthermore, one can
notice that those two viewpoints (to anything) share the same formal structure of a bit of
information, therefore being identifiable as the “philosophical” bit of information.
Moreover, the aspect of the mismatch of eidos and phenomenon can serve further as for the
philosophical definition of motion (or synonymically, “movement’) as the necessary (and thus
essential) property of whatever claiming to be physical. A sufficient, but not necessary condition
of that non-coincidence is time, or respectively, well-ordering. On the contrary, the
complementary mathematical aspect to anything (particularly implying general
mathematizabilty: Penchev 2020 June 29) consists in the identification of phenomenon and
eidos, implementable in a relevant mathematical “model”13 and originating directly from the
postulate of the totality. Consequently, the totality is to be definitively mathematical rather than
physical, empirical or experimental: an observation reflectable as Pythagoreanism, or rather, as
neo-Pythagoreanism.
At last, one can track how the formal structure of a bit consisting of three identical qubits is
relevant to transcendental reduction as well as to its interpretation by the identification of
phenomenological and eidetic reduction. One considers the infinite set of bits embeddable in
each bit internally or locally, i.e as a qubit in the final analysis (Penchev 2021 July 10). The
procedure generates again14 the qubit Hilbert space as complementary (or identical) to Hilbert
arithmetic.
14 Another method was used above.
13 The quotation marks serve to hint that the “model” at issue coincides with reality, unlike the usual use
of the same term in default.
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The axiom of choice allows for the identification of any triple of “number-sake” (namesake)
qubits with the complete qubit Hilbert space since the countable set consisting of countable sets
is in turn countable in relation to all elements of the latter sets. Just that identification
corresponds to transcendental reduction by means of the identification of phenomenological and
eidetic reduction.
The main conclusion of the present section can be that (1) Husserl’s phenomenology granted
to be formalizable describes in detail the “philosophical” bit of information; (2) it both unifies
and distinguishes as complementary the physical and mathematical aspect of the world, once
interpreted formally.
VI A TEST BY HILBERT ARITHMETIC
Husserl (1900-1901) changed his viewpoint to the foundation of arithmetic radically in
“Logical investigations” in comparison with his previous work (1891). He tried to justify
arithmetic in the framework of psychologism, i.e inferring it from human experience, eventually
mental in an inductive way in the sense of “physical induction”. The subsequent root change as a
result of the reflection and reinterpretation of his initial intention reordered logic, arithmetic, and
psychology just in that sequence of fundamentality therefore allowing for psychology (and
philosophy, in the final analysis) to be justified logically, i.e as a “rigorous science”.
That general idea of “Logical investigations” partly corresponds to the almost contemporary
to it, large-scale work in three volumes, “Principia mathematica” undertaken by Russell and
Whitehead (any edition) to ground all mathematics rigorously only on a logical foundation. So,
both share the idea, arithmetic to be inferred from logic, though the discourse of the former is
rather philosophical, and that of the latter is mathematical, but Husserl, turning “upside down”
his initial intention (1891), continued further, to the deduction of psychology and philosophy on
the same logical basis, thus as a unified rigorous science of both philosophical Spirit and human
mind originating from the totality in the final analysis necessarily and logically.
The present paper shares the same “pathos”, only articulating it as “scientific
transcendentalism” and extending it to physics and the aspect of the world studied by it.
The most notorious fundamental result in the track of “Principia mathematica” are the Gödel
incompleteness theorems (1931), already discussed above partly. If one interprets the
“philosophical” bit of information according to the explicated by Gödel dichotomy in the relation
of (Peano) arithmetic to (ZFC) set theory: either incompleteness or inconsistency, the former can
be understood as a solution of the latter, at that, implying a complement of arithmetic to set
theory consistent to both and overcoming the “incompleteness of arithmetic” by the unified
structure of “Hilbert arithmetic”:
The methodological essence of the solution consists in the addition of the dichotomy itself,
demonstrated by Gödel, to arithmetic in order to become consistent to set theory for both are
necessary for the consistent and complete foundations of mathematics. Indeed, any dichotomy
implies a bit of information after its two alternatives are reliably divided as complementary to
each other. The dichotomy turns out to be a contradiction (i.e. a violation of the noncontradiction
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3892039
law of propositional logic) if and only if the alternatives are necessary to be meant
simultaneously:
The formal structure of a bit of information prevents the direct conflict by adding two
oppositions, which can be interpreted by “terms of contradiction” as follows: (1) the
contradiction is opposed to its solution; (2) the alternative of the solution is opposed to the other
one. Properly, the formal structure of Bohr’s complementarity is the same unlike Hegel’s logical
and ontological “triad” as far as it can be interpreted to identify the contradiction with the
solution as “synthesis”, however not less distinguishing them in “philosophical time” considering
the “synthesis” as  the new “thesis” at the next metalevel15.
Though quite meaningful, Hegel’s approach is to be rather modified16 to be identifiable with
Bohr’s complementarity or with any structure admissible by propositional logic as conscient to
it. As it is well-known, it, applied directly, implies the rejection of the non-contradictory law of
propositional logic. On the contrary, the additional bit of information is the general method for
any antinomy to be reconciled with propositional logic by dividing the mutually exclusive
alternatives of the contradiction to be valid in two mutually exclusive relations relevant for each
of the alternatives correspondingly.
Returning to the Gödel dichotomy, one only is to apply the general solution of any logical
paradox to the relation of arithmetic and set theory, more precisely, to the alternative of
inconsistent completeness, by an additional bit of information and interpreting it in terms of the
relation. Thus, it can be added only at the next metalevel: therefore doubling Peano arithmetic by
its dual counterpart, “from infinity backwards”, and unifying both “twins” cancelling their
opposed well-orderings by the nonstandard Peano arithmetic and demonstrating that it shares the
structure of Boolean algebra with both propositional logic and set theory.
One suggests that the essence of logic and set theory (at least as to arithmetic) is their
isomorphism as the same Boolean algebra rather than their questionless absolute distinction to
two quite different areas: logic and mathematics. Then, the nonstandard Peano arithmetic can
bring the isomorphism to them as Boolean algebra is sufficient to be identifiable with them.
On the other hand (i.e. on the other side of the logical “bridge” which the structure of
Boolean algebra builds between set theory and arithmetic), one is to make Boolean algebra clear
as a modified, modulo 2 arithmetic17 therefore unifying all odd natural numbers as the same and
all even natural numbers as the same. In other words, the nonstandard Peano arithmetic cancels
and replaces the well-ordering (definitive for Peano arithmetic due to function successor) by
17 If conjunction can be identified as the modulo 2 multiplication, the correspondence of disjunction and
the modulo 2 addition though unambiguous needs a relevant redefinition; negation corresponds to the
idempotent transformation of even and odd natural numbers. However, negation interpreted to the dual
twin Peano arithmetics is to be identified with the correspondence of namesake natural numbers in each
of them.
16 For example, by the two philosophical doctrines utilized by Bohr to justify quantum complementarity,
namely: Kirkegaard’s “non-synthesizing dialectics” or the “Yin-Yang-Thao” structure of Chinese
philosophy.
15 By the way, a solution claimed by Marx to be his innovation and contribution to Hegel’s original
doctrine.
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idempotency (furthemore, featuring a bit of information). Also vice versa: if modulo 2 arithmetic
is given initially, one can obtain two Peano arithmetics only enumerating by natural numbers the
consecutive idempotencies therefore distinguishing each of them unambiguously, i.e. adding a
well-ordering in the final analysis18.
Summarizing, Husserl’s idea of logic underlying arithmetic is reduced formally in the present
context as the structure of Boolean algebra (eventually interpreted as modulo 2 arithmetic)
implying Peano arithmetic after removing the “philosophical” bit of information applied at the
next metalevel and thus returning to the level itself19.
VII CONCLUSION
The main conclusion consists in the observation that the advance of science needs the
unification of philosophy, physics, and mathematics and especially, of their foundations. Until
now, on the contrary, they are absolutely parted, confessing radically different conceptions of
truth (correspondingly: metaphysical and unfalsifiable truth shared by promoters, companions,
and followers; logical consistency; and experimental confirmation), and thus, in a state of
permanent conflict for border and disputed territories.
The paper considers first of all the relevant changes in philosophy, which would allow for it
to overcome the contradictions with mathematics and physics stepping on the pathway of
unification. It means Husserl’s phenomenology proclaimed for the first time philosophy to
become a “rigorous science”, moreover, following rather formal and logical ideas.
The testament and legacy of Husserl, often understood to be rather properly philosophical or
even metaphorical, the paper interprets literally, namely, by discussing the necessary changes in
philosophy by the case study of phenomenology if it wishes to be similar to mathematics and
physics, i.e. indeed a “rigorous science”. The conception of scientific transcendentalism intended
as a falsifiable counterpart of philosophical transcendentalism is involved, and the postulate of
the totality is to be formulated in a falsifiable way relevant to science.
Particularly, a certain mathematical structure inferable from the totality and shareable with
the foundations of physics (quantum mechanics) and mathematics (arithmetic and set theory) is
ascribed to phenomenology therefore conceding it to be absolutely formal against to the
prejudice for philosophy to belong to humantarity, but just according to Husserl’s insight if it is
suggested to be applicable literally.
The structure at issue is that of the “philosophical” bit of information, unifying at the next
metalevel, three identical qubits: thus identifiable as both the qubit Hilbert space (for the
foundations of physics) and Hilbert arithmetic (for the foundations of mathematics. Special
attention is paid to the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) because overcoming the
restriction of them is a necessary condition for establishing that formal structure as general.
Finally, “epoché” and the phenomenological (psychological), eidetic, and transcendental
reductions are reinterpreted formally, by means of that structure and reunified in virtue of it. A
19 There exists a direct correspondence to Russell’s theory of types.
18 One should notice that the equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering “theorem” is
isomorphic to the relation of the nonstandard and standard Peano arithmetics.
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new, formal and logical viewpoint to the relations and unity of the foundations of philosophy,
physics, and mathematics is open. Speaking loosely, just the “philosophical” bit of information is
sufficient to be added to (Peano) arithmetic, therefore transforming it into Hilbert arithmetic, to
reconcile it with set theory as well as in order to identify it with the qubit Hilbert space whether
as equivalent or as complementary; or quite metaphorically, but concisely: philosophy unified
with mathematics (therefore implying a new form of Pythagoreanism) is physics.
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